A much better solution, I think, is to write my post offline in Thunderbird – and then e-mail it to Posterous when I’m at an internet connection. So that’s what I’ll do.

You can follow my African Posterous blog here: http://blog.joelitobarski.com/

Welcome to the second part in my series examing democracy in the EU

Let’s begin with Andrew Moravcsik [PDF]. For Moravcsik, the EU system is above all a constitutional democracy – one with “tight constraints” on behaviour that “combine and exceed the most extreme constraints in national systems.” Democracy in the EU is based fundamentally on the separation of powers, rather than purely on the sovereignty of parliaments. Moravcsik argues that the various checks and balances in the EU system are more powerful than any individual national democracy, primarily because of the way power is divided within the EU: “vertically among the Commission, Council, Parliament and Court, horizontally among local, national and transnational levels – requiring concurrent majorities for action.”

However, even if it’s true the EU has a strong constitutional pillar, this fact alone would not make it more democratically legitimate. According to Yves Mény [PDF], there are two “pillars” to any democratic system – one pillar made up of the popular will and the other made up of the constitutional checks and balances that regulate and moderate the “excesses” of the first pillar (such as the persecution of minority groups). Since WWII and the “disastrous experiences of many countries which had brought to power dictators via democratic elections,” Mény believes that Western democracies have in general been strengthening their constitutional pillars at the expense of their popular pillars – for example, through the introduction of human rights, gender equality and anti-descrimination legislation. The result has been a distortion of the signals voters send to their representatives about which policy choices they might favour:

“The people might send messages of all kinds but not be heard by the representatives who are convinced they are choosing the right options. People’s frustration derives partly from the incapacity to put their problems on the political agenda in spite of ‘sending messages’ to those who govern.”

This leads, according to Mény’s logic, to widespread voter apathy and the perception that the state lacks democratic legitimacy (in this way, Mény argues that the “democratic deficit” is a phenomenon of modern democracies in general, and not something unique to the EU). A viable democratic system therefore needs balance between the popular and constitutional pillars of democracy; the precise equilibrium of that balance may vary depending on the context, but the important thing is that neither pillar overwhelms the other. If the popular pillar is too strong, it might lead to the “tyranny of the majority” which De Tocqueville feared; if the constitutional pillar is too strong (and the number of “checks and balances” interrupts signals being sent to policy elites by voters) then electorates might grow disillusioned with the entire political system.

The “two pillar” model, however, is not necessarily the commonly accepted perception of democracy. Mény argues that “unfortunately, too many citizens are still convinced that democracy is only the power of the demos” (i.e. that the popular pillar is the source of all democratic legitimacy) and they do not recognise the importance of constitutional checks and balances to moderate the democratic process – by, for example, protecting minority groups or insulating policy-formation from the influence of concentrated interest-groups seeking to shape decision-making at the expense of a more diffuse general public. On the other hand, nor should the importance of the popular pillar be underestimated – the EU might have a strong “constitutional” system of checks and balances, manifested especially in the extraordinarily effective separation of powers between institutions and levels of governance, but a strong constitutional pillar is not a substitute for a weak popular pillar; both elements of democracy should be represented.

That’s it for this post, I’m afraid. Just a short introduction to the concept, really – because I want to cover a lot of ground within 4000 words. Next time, I’ll be examining the “insulated” nature of EU institutions – where shadowy eurocrats are appointed to positions rather than being elected by the people of Europe.

Photo Credit – CC / Flickr: European Parliament

Right – let’s have a look at the origins of the phrase. In fact, it was first coined in the 1979 book “Parliament for Europe” by Professor David Marquand – then British Labour MP and former Chief Advisor to the President of the European Commission (1977-1979). Far from having its origins in the stalwart tradition of British Euroscepticism, the phrase “democratic deficit” was originally part of a call for faster, deeper union. Funny that a term invented to provoke deeper integration has become such a champion cause of eurosceptics, isn’t it?

Marquand – who was then writing about the European Economic Community (the forerunner of today’s European Union) – argued that the “democratic deficit” was slowing the process of European unity, thereby contributing to the economic “Eurosclerosis” of the 1970s and early 1980s. He wrote:

“One of the reasons why the pace of integration has been so slow is that the Commission – which alone has the technical and juridical authority to provide the impetus for further integration – lacks… democratic legitimacy…”

Throughout “Parliament in Europe,” Marquand argued that the “[European] Parliament has had too little weight to play more than a decorative role” and that substantially more “parliamentary accountability” would be needed to encourage further European integration. For Marquand, then, the problem was that the EU had no democratic legitimacy.

Those “undemocratic” Eurocrats are keenly aware of this accusation. The EU even defines the “democratic deficit” itself in an online glossary of terms; the “official” definition being expanded slightly from Marquand’s original to include criticism of the overly-complex nature of EU politics:

“Democratic deficit is a concept invoked principally in the argument that the European Union and its various bodies suffer from a lack of democracy and seem inaccessible to the ordinary citizen because their method of operating is so complex. The view is that the Community institutional set-up is dominated by an institution combining legislative and government powers (the Council of the European Union) and an institution that lacks democratic legitimacy (the European Commission).”

However, as Simon Hix and Andreas Follesdal have pointed out, no commonly agreed definition of the term exists in the literature. Hix and Follesdal have therefore synthesised five main claims, some combination of which is common to most definitions of the “democratic deficit”:

• Firstly, European integration has strengthened national executives at the expense of national parliaments because executive agents are insulated from national parliamentary oversight at the European level. Furthermore, because the EU often represents an alternative route for introducing legislation, national executives are given the option of bypassing their parliaments.

• Secondly, the European parliament is – as Marquand complained – too weak to carry any real weight. This criticism applies less and less as each subsequent treaty revision has strengthened the relative power of the Parliament, but those critics who see the European Parliament as the only truly democratically legitimate institution within the EU might still argue for a stronger Parliament.

• Thirdly, there are no truly “European” elections for the European Parliament. EP elections are seen by European citizens, media and politicians as “second-order” national elections of no great importance. This means that voter turn-out is low, further undermining the legitimacy of the EP and giving disproportionate representation to smaller, fringe political parties. Furthermore, this situation creates a disconnect between the European Parliament (whose area of competence is pan-European) and the issues upon which European voters select their representatives.

• Fourthly, the European Union is seen as being too “distant” from voters. Andrew Moravcsik puts this down to the fact that “an organization of continental scope will, of course, appear rather distant from the individual European citizen.” Moravcsik doesn’t mention how the almost-continental United States of America has solved this problem, but Hix and Follesdal speculate that at least part of this perception may be down to the absence of a truly European demos, at the root of which is the fact that there is no shared language or culture common to all Europeans.

• Finally, Hix and Follesdal suggest that (partly as a result of the above) the “EU adopts policies that are not supported by a majority of citizens in many or even most member states.” The end results of European democracy are therefore judged unsatisfactory, especially when you consider how vulnerable the policy-formation process is to influence from private interest groups.

As a starting definition, then, we can say that a “democratic deficit” entails a lack of democratic legitimacy within a political system resulting from an excessively complex and opaque political process, inadequate public involvement in said process and insufficient seperation of powers and checks and balances. With this broad framework in mind for our definition, we can continue in the next post to examine whether or not the EU really has a democratic deficit.

Photo credits: Creative Commons (BY-NC-ND) European Parliament

Meanwhile, one of the largest EU member-states has been completely absent from the story. The UK is not a Eurozone country and so doesn’t vote on Eurozone matters (nor does it expect to be part of any bail-out) – but it has also been distracted by the recent general election result of a hung parliament (likely because most UK voters misunderstood the concept, and had actually wanted to “hang” parliament).

There are now furious (but probably very sleepy) negotiations going on behind the scenes in Britain, as both Labour and the Conservatives flirt with Lib Dem leader Nick Clegg and try to entice him into coalition. There is no political culture of coalition-making in the UK, so one might expect our politicians to be clumsy and unused to it – but, on the other hand, because we so rarely have coalitions in the UK and there are expectations of strong government, negotiations are unlikely to drag on and on for months (as in Belgium, for example). Meanwhile, whilst the EU is undergoing possibly historic changes, the most eurosceptic country in the union is not paying a great deal of attention (at least, in public).

On 9 May 1950, French foreign-minister Robert Schuman made his famous declaration announcing the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community. 60 years (and one day) later, the European Union is proposing powerful new financial instruments for intervening in the eurozone and preventing the collapse of member-state economies. We should be cautious of assuming a progressive view of EU history (i.e. the idea that steps towards closer union are always “successes” for the EU and that it represents a “failure” when these steps are rejected), but I’m sure French President Sarkozy had the significance of the date in mind when he spoke on behalf of the “Council of the Eurozone” (a completely invented council with no basis in EU law) and announced on Friday that powerful new measures were planned.

Is this a historic occassion, as important as the Schuman Declaration? It’s too early to tell, but probably not. Charlemagne (who I hope is getting some sleep, after a weekend-from-Hell covering both the UK election and the EU financial crisis) does not believe this is a step towards full fiscal union. Rather, this is a compromise solution in an attempt to avoid full fiscal union, but still prevent the monetary union from collapsing. Nonetheless, an important step is being taken. Any new UK government is going to wake up to find itself committed to a powerful new financial support mechanism, despite the fact the UK is not in the Eurozone. This is (potentially) a politically explosive situation.

A remarkable weekend.

National identity, no matter the horrors of the 20th century, is important. It forms what the scholar Benedict Anderson calls an “imagined community” – a shared set of signs and symbols that create bonds of loyalty between absolute strangers. Some academics argue that nationalism is even a vital step in the evolution of a liberal market economy. The free market – so the argument goes – cannot function well beyond the village-level without some form of nationalism; trade contracts are based upon trusting strangers and shared identities foster trust.

I honestly believe that some form of European national identity can exist – because I feel it myself. There are shared cultural, historical, religious (or philosophical) and linguistic bonds between most Europeans. However, individual national identities should never be subsumed by an artificial “EU” identity. Instead, the existing bonds should be strengthened – which in some cases means strengthening the idea of the nationstate.

In the 21st century we face problems that individual nations working alone cannot overcome. Transnational crime, mass migration, global trade, extreme poverty, war, terrorism, environmental damage and energy security are all issues we are stronger facing together. If we abolished the European Union, these problems would not go away, they would deepen. Yes, the EU has its flaws – it is technocratic, slow to react and distant from the people of Europe. However, in the real world there are no instant solutions to problems. Instead, you are forced to choose your problem set – and I would rather have technocratic bureaucracy and slow consensus politics over bickering intergovernmentalism and power politics.

So, my Europe is a compromise. Not a federal superstate, nor a weak collection of nationstates. I’m sure nobody will be entirely happy with it, but I hope that few people will actively hate it. Without doubt, the EU needs the support of Europeans or it will not survive. But, for me, the answer is not more federalism on the one hand or the abolition of the EU on the other. For me, the answer is more compromise, a multi-tier Europe and respect for the European nationstate.

I don’t think I’ve got a choice but to downsize. My wife and I will be in Africa for six or seven months, and I’m going to want to blog during my time there. If I’m going to be blogging from internet cafes with patchy 56k connections (or worse) then I’ve got to dump most of my “multimedia-rich” design.

Fine. Not a problem. I’ll try to sneak in pictures of Ethiopia when I get the chance, but otherwise this is going to be a very plain-looking website for the next few months. I’ve managed to get the load-time to just over a minute on a 14k connection, which is not too bad. It should take less than 20 seconds to load my page on a 56k modem. That’s do-able.

What happens when you take a digital native out of his digital homeland?

Except that these views obviously do have a place in the modern Conservative party. Roger Helmer, the Conservative MEP for East Midlands, today admitted that he felt it was:

“A shame we fired Philip Lardner for daring to express Christian views.”

If I were at Tory HQ right now I’d be wondering just what in God’s name Helmer thought he was trying to achieve by coming out with something like this on #$%*ing election day!! Did he have nothing better to do? Was he feeling particularly destructive? Perhaps he’s trying to sabotage the Tory party?

Helmer has courted controversy before. In 2009 he wrote on his blog that the word “homophobia” is “merely a propaganda device” used to “denigrate and stigmatise those holding conventional opinions.” Popular Tory blogger Iain Dale (who is openly gay) defended Helmer at the time (whilst distancing himself from Helmer’s comments about homophobia) – but it seems to me that Iain’s position is looking a little shaky now that Helmer has come out in support of Philip Lardner.

When Lardner was suspended for claiming gays aren’t normal, Dale called him an “idiot,” a “dinosaur” and an “ignorant fool” who held “disgusting views on homosexuality.” He also wrote that:

“I’m glad the party took a very speedy decision and sacked him… [Lardner] apparently thinks homosexuality isn’t ‘normal’. It is in fact quite normal. It’s just not the ‘norm’. He talks about it as not being an ‘equivalent lifestyle choice’. It’s not a choice. It’s how you’re born. And anyone who believes otherwise is an ignorant fool.”

Does that make Helmer an ignorant fool? I asked Iain what he thought about Helmer’s public support for Lardner, and he replied that he:

Shakes [his] head in frustration and disbelief. As they say, Roger will be Roger.

Which was exactly Tony Blair’s reaction when John Prescott punched a voter in the face during the 2001 election campaign (“John will be John,” Blair joked – and effectively defused the situation). I like Iain Dale and I enjoy reading his blog, but if I were him I would be cringing at this latest blunder.

Both Helmer and Lardner have made it clear that they do not consider themselves homophobic (or “gayist,” or whatever term Helmer would prefer) and that they believe in the rights of homosexuals (albeit “within reason”). Instead, they both argue that they are champions of common sense and that they’re being persecuted by the PC-brigade and “militant” homosexual groups. Indeed, Lardner has even rebranded himself on his website as the “common sense” candidate with a call for voters to “stand up” to the PC “bullies.”

Fine. I completely disagree with both of them, but I respect their freedom of speech. However, I think that either Helmer is in the wrong party or Cameron is lying to us when he claims that the Tories have moderated their views on homosexuality. If Lardner’s comments were deemed serious enough to suspend him from the party, should Helmer really be publically supporting them? On election day?

From a Tory perspective, Helmer’s behaviour in the European Parliament was partly responsible for the carcrash of an interview by David Cameron with The Gay Times. Cameron was challenged with the fact that Conservative MEPs (including Helmer) had refused to support a motion in the European Parliament that condemned the Lithuanian equivalent of Section 28. Cameron’s rather weak response was that:

“I’ll have to go back and look at this particular law… I barely ever issue instructions to my MEPs to vote in this way or in that way, the MEPs have their own leader, they have their own group, and I just don’t routinely look at their voting behaviour and say will you do this rather than that, that’s not the way the party runs.”

More damagingly, he was forced to admit that:

“If something like that came up in this House of Commons, I expect it would be whipped.”

Does Cameron regard the European Parliament as a dumping ground for the extreme Tory fringe? Or is Cameron the only thing keeping his party from adopting the old line on issues like homosexuality? Because Helmer’s position is not the position the Conservative party is selling to voters. In fact, Helmer (who has had the whip withdrawn before) disagrees with the official Tory line on issue after issue: he supports withdrawal from the EU, he doesn’t believe in man-made climate-change and he even disagrees with Tory policy on overseas aid (Helmer believes we should cut aid because, in hard times, charity begins at home).

Like I said, Helmer is welcome to his “maverick” views. It’s a free country, and he can think what he wants. However, I’m surprised he can find time on election day both to voice his support for Philip Lardner and to publish a post on his blog arguing that:

“Climate alarmism has become the most expensive, and the most wasteful, project in the history of the world.  It is junk economics built on junk science. “

Doesn’t he have better things to do? Like not contradicting his party leader on election day? Evidently, Cameron doesn’t give a toss what happens in the European Parliament. Until the next carcrash of an interview rolls round, that is…

David Cameron is also no doubt smiling today, because his party has possibly just dodged a bullet. EU Observer reports that the British civil service has decided to ignore the EU’s April deadline to publish the 2009 data showing how much money British farms received in subsidies from the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

Jack Thurston, an activist campaigning for CAP reform, left a comment on Jon Worth’s blog in which he posted a statement from Defra – the body responsible for releasing the data:

“This decision reflects the need to maintain, and be seen to maintain, the impartiality of the UK Civil Service, given the potential risk that CAP payment information relating to any individuals involved in the election might be used as part of election campaigning.”

Defra’s decision tells us two things. First of all – the UK is quite happy to ignore EU deadlines when it wants to. The idea that the EU says “jump” and the UK jumps is a naïve view of EU-UK relations; when the UK wants to break the rules, it breaks the rules. Superstate, this is not.

Secondly: despite what it says, Defra is not being non-partisan by refusing to abide by EU rules. The release of farm subsidy data would almost certainly have disproportionately hurt the Tories, whose candidates traditionally have closer ties to agriculture. Defra’s decision is therefore immediately political – whatever it decides will either favour Labour or the Tories (as for the Lib Dems: I’m not sure. Shamefully, I never gave them much serious thought until the recent TV debates).

I don’t believe Defra should even be able to make a decision like this. If the Tories have something to be ashamed about, then they should defend it publically. The Scottish government agrees with this position, and Jack points out that the 2009 data was released in Scotland. Of course, the Conservatives have very little chance of winning in Scotland – so the civil service there is less worried about annoying its future masters.

Why not just follow the rules? Whatever Defra chose – to release or not – it would have favoured one or other party/parties, and that makes it a political decision. However, if it had just followed EU rules then it could have depoliticised things somewhat by deferring responsibility.

I’m really not interested in hurting the Tories on this – if Labour or the Lib Dems were in their position then I would be arguing the same. If Tory candidates thought there was something shameful about accepting subsidies, then they shouldn’t have accepted them. If there was an argument to be made for accepting them, then it should already have been made.

Out, you break from the grey and there before you the green forests of Europe stretch, the continent dissected by the blue of rivers, the white of mountain peaks. Look down. Fly towards that great, sparkling lake of the south: the Mediterranean.

Do you see the plumes of ugly black smoke curling up into the hot southern air? Those are the pyres of the Greek rioters, protesting against the new austerity. The Greek economy is imploding. Edward Hugh from A Fistful of Euros investigates events in his usual, detailed manner and I cover the events in my own way.

Swoop up. Fly away from the wreckage; fly north. Do you hear the sound of angry voices? They come from Belgium, where the government has come crashing down over nationalist tensions between the Flemish north and Francophone south. Jean Quatremer does not see how the country of Belgium can survive much longer, except as an “empty husk.”

But listen closely. Beneath the shouting, can you hear the whispers? They come from the shadows in the heart of the Belgian capital. Can you hear what they’re saying? Jon Worth tells of nasty rumours floating on the winds of Brussels that High Representative Ashton is on the verge of resigning. Honor Mahoney doubts the rumours are true – why would Ashton resign now before she’s completed the new European “Diplomatic Corps” (something Christophe offers us hope about)? These black whispers are the sounds  of a power-struggle being waged at the very top, in the palaces of the powerful. Our leaders, supposed to be offering us direction, are instead focusing their energies behind the scenes on bickering and power-plays.

Yet, now… Can you hear that? Even beneath the whispers there is noise. The clanking of chains and the faintest moans of the damned; through the corridors of the European Parliament stalk the pale spectres of the ghost MEPs. These are the ghosts of democracy passed. Ralf Grahn writes about their shame with anger.

Fly north then, against the bitter squall, across the barbarian waters. Something is happening on the island here. The natives are gathered round their television sets, watching their leaders preen and bicker. They know there’s danger on the mainland, but they think the danger comes from the mainland. EUoplocephalus writes of the belief among these shores that those who go to the continent come back corrupted. From a nearby island, Jason O’Mahoney can only stare in wonder at the ritual these islanders call democracy.

But let us head further to the north, to the frozen lands of the Northmen. There is danger enough here, to be sure. A fierce battle is being waged against the pagan vikings of the digital generation, who raid the keeps and monasteries of the powerful. The monks inside have suffered blood and sweat to build up their gilded libraries, but the savages shout them down and say they guard their treasures too closely. Now everything is for the taking.

Do we see the monks now turning to dark arts to protect their riches from the fury of the raiders? Christian, a Pirate Party MEP, argues that the copyright lobby is hiding behind the issue of child pornography to make website-blocking acceptable. He has posted the transcript of a radio interview he gave with Commissioner Cecilia Malmström – accusing her of walking Europe into the censorship trap.

Fly away. Fly away. Leave this broken continent, with its battles and its anger; go somewhere else, far across the sea. Find a better land, because surely all hope is lost in this damnable place.

Is there hope for Europe? Can we turn the tide? Maybe. But if there is any hope to be had, it comes from the people of Europe and not our leaders. New technology is bringing the distant palaces of Europe within our grasp, but the eurocrats inside are still struggling to hear what we’re saying. The European Commission has opened up a new blog investigating how it can better use social media – and they need your suggestions on ways we can use these new technologies to better govern ourselves. Meanwhile, Julien Frisch is using new tools to change the way we visualise and think about the torrent of information pouring out of the institutions each day.

Whatever you may think about Europe, you are a part of this snapshot. Next week is “Europe Day” – supposedly a celebration of our continent. But, looking out across the bickering and the waste, what do we really have to celebrate? Europe is at the crossroads, struggling to find itself and not sure what it wants to be. Our leaders can’t offer us direction – they’re still floating about up in the clouds – unsure which way is up, which is down, which is left and which is right.

Next week is your opportunity to write about the Europe you would like to see. Go to the My Europe website and use this form to send us your vision of Europe. You post will appear on Bloggingportal, and the best posts will be sent out in our newsletter and tweeted by our editors. If you have a blog, then this is a great way to join the conversation. If you don’t have a blog, then this is a way to get your voice heard.

May 3rd to May 9th 2010 is My Europe Week.

Share your Europe.